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Abstract
In last night’s State of the Union message, President Clinton challenged the United States
to sustain our role as the leader in the fight for freedom and peace. Three years of American
leadership by President Clinton have already produced great benefits for the American people and
for the world community. Through determination and the exercise of American leadership, we
have repeatedly turned challenges into real gains for Americans. In the Office of Policy Planning,
we often are torn between helping to coordinate day-to-day policy and longer-term planning. In
our fast-forward world, long-term sometimes means next Monday, and history is what happened
last Friday. That said, as the director of the office responsible for helping frame policy in a larger
context, I would like to take a step back tonight, and talk about the broader principles and strategies
that lie behind the President’s remarkable foreign policy accomplishments.
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In last night's State of the Union message,' President Clin-
ton challenged the United States to sustain our role as the leader
in the fight for freedom and peace. Three years of American
leadership by President Clinton have already produced great
benefits for the American people and for the world community.
Had America not led, the war in Bosnia would continue today
with mounting casualties - a war threatening European stabil-
ity, eroding the NATO alliance, and damaging U.S. credibility.
Had we not led, peace in the Middle East would not be on the
horizon, and we would face a growing crisis in Haiti. Without
U.S. leadership, the prospect for new American jobs and eco-
nomic growth through important trade agreements such as the
WTO, NAFTA, and successful auto negotiations with the Japa-
nese would remain beyond reach. The Mexican economy would
be in free-fall, threatening our economic security and the stabil-
ity of the world's financial markets. The President's leadership
assured that nuclear weapons programs were halted in North
Korea and Iraq, and that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty2
was indefinitely and unconditionally extended. Through deter-
mination and the exercise of American leadership, we have re-
peatedly turned challenges into real gains for Americans.
In the Office of Policy Planning, we often are torn between
helping to coordinate day-to-day policy and longer-term plan-
ning. In our fast-forward world, long-term sometimes means
next Monday, and history is what happened last Friday. That
said, as the director of the office responsible for helping frame
* Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State. This Address was given to
the Foreign Policy Association in New York City, January 24, 1996. All footnotes con-
tained herein were provided by the Fordham International Law Journal.
1. See Prepared Text for the President's State of the Union Message, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1996, at A14.
2. Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
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policy in a larger context, I would like to take a step back to-
night, and talk about the broader principles and strategies that
lie behind the President's remarkable foreign policy accomplish-
ments.
Policy planners contend daily with the legacy of our first di-
rector - George Kennan. Mr. Kennan served from 1947-49, at
a time when the United States was resisting its instinct to turn
inwards once more, and was instead helping build a stable post-
war order. He earned his place in American history, of course,
by arguing that "the main element of any United States policy
toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but
firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."
With that single word - "containment" - he set the direction
for more than forty years of U.S. foreign policy.
"Containment" primarily was a prescription for U.S. policy.
Yet containment rested on an understanding of the interna-
tional system dominated by the threat of communist aggression.
This one word became the bumper-sticker of the Cold War.
Containing the Soviet Union was used to justify almost every for-
eign policy activity, from regional interventions and the building
of security alliances, to supporting economic institutions and for-
eign assistance.
Since the collapse of the Soviet external and internal em-
pire, many analysts have sought to find a new bumper-sticker,
one that would characterize the post-Cold War international sys-
tem and set the new paradigm for U.S. foreign policy. So many
theories have surfaced, in fact, that they've exhausted the mem-
ory of the State Department's antiquated computer system.
At first, optimism was the prevailing sentiment. We were
told that a New World Order was within reach, where American
power would tame lawless aggressors. Others claimed that we
had reached the End of History, where market democracy had
become accepted worldwide as the only possible - indeed, his-
torically inevitable - form of government. Others told us of a
Borderless World, where international commerce would wash
over governments and erase territorial boundaries, and where
the invisible hand of the market-place might overcome every ill,
from authoritarianism in China to famine in Africa to poverty in
India.
Pessimists soon made a comeback. They told us of the Coin-
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ing Anarchy, where unchecked environmental damage and
rapid population growth will make many parts of the world un-
governable, and will unleash floods of economic and political
refugees to our own shores. Others warned that we live at the
early stages of a Clash of Civilizations, where antagonistic cul-
tures with irreconcilable values and objectives will engage in con-
stant conflict with one another, tearing at the fragile economic
and political ties that bind the world's peoples.
Each of these grand theories contains within it many impor-
tant truths. But whatever the merit of physics' never-ending
search for a Great Unified Theory, the world we face today is far
too complicated to describe in one theory or fit on a bumper
sticker. Our interests are too broad, our challenges too diverse.
And too often, broad oversimplifications either hide or distort
reality.
Kennan, to his credit, rejected simplistic understandings of
the communist threat. He eventually came to oppose our in-
volvement in Vietnam, for instance, because he saw Southeast
Asia as peripheral to our core national interests and the war it-
self as about nationalism, not communism. And while Kennan
accurately predicted (nearly fifty years ago) that the Soviet sys-
tem would collapse, he did so based on a careful analysis of its
component parts: the ideology of its leaders, the fundamental
weaknesses of the command economic system, and the weariness
of the Russian people. He came to reject the more extravagant
extensions of containment policy as ignoring communism's
greatest weakness - the communist system itself.
Today, Kennan continues to speak out against the danger of
seizing too quickly on any single policy prescription, but he still
counsels us to define sound principles - "principles that accord
with the nature, the needs, the interests, and the limitations of
our country." These principles should define the real-world de-
mands on a nation's capacity to act, and the limits on its ability
to do so. Leaders have a responsibility to articulate principles, to
inform the public about their perception of the national inter-
est, especially when dangers and opportunities are not immedi-
ately obvious.
Last week at Harvard, Secretary Christopher reaffirmed four
core principles that have come to guide foreign policy in the
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Clinton Administration. These principles are designed to meet
today's opportunities and dangers.
Our first and most important principle is that America must
lead if we want to protect our national interests and values. No
other nation has the power, the resources, the respect, and the
authority to lead. Leadership means that we will act alone when
we must, but work with others when we can.
Whether bringing peace to troubled regions, strengthening
our role in the global economy, or fighting transnational threats
from nuclear proliferation, crime, terrorism or environmental
decay, our leadership has often meant the difference between
success and failure. Leadership does not come cheap. Forces in
Congress have proposed cuts in our foreign affairs budget that
would cripple our diplomacy just when we are beginning to reap
the benefits of the end of the Cold War. Of course we have im-
portant responsibilities to attend to at home. But we can't create
jobs if foreign markets are not open. We can't build a secure
future if drug trafficking is flourishing or if dangerous nations
develop nuclear weapons. Think about how short-sighted it is
for Congress not to find $22 million to implement KEDO, and
freeze North Korea's nuclear program. In fact, for less than one
third of one percent of our GDP, and just a little more than one
percent of all government spending, we could fund the entire
foreign affairs budget. These are modest outlays by the world's
standards, but they represent an American commitment to the
world that will, in turn, catalyze major contributions by our allies
and friends.
A second principle is the need to strengthen the institutions
that provide an enduring basis for global peace and prosperity.
For half a century, institutions such as NATO, the U.N., GATT,
the IMF, and the World Bank have helped the United States to
share the burdens of leadership. Some critics argue that we
should significantly diminish our links to these institutions.
These critics would leave the United States with only two'
choices: do nothing or do it by ourselves. That's the choice we
would face in Bosnia without NATO, the U.N., the OSCE, or the
World Bank. That's the choice we would have faced when Mex-
ico's economy collapsed, without the International Monetary
Fund. And that's the choice we would have faced without the
U.N. when nations like Haiti, El Salvador, Cambodia and Angola
needed help to recover from civil war and famine.
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That's why we're reinvigorating old institutions, and build-
ing new ones. We are adapting and adjusting proven institutions
such as NATO, and extending their benefits to new members.
We are creating new arrangements with our neighbors and our
European allies, such as the Summit of the Americas, and the
Transatlantic Marketplace. And the President has taken major
steps towards strengthening consultation and cooperation in
Asia - on economic matters through the annual APEC leaders'
meetings, and on security issues through the Asean Regional Fo-
rum and the Northeast Asian Security Dialogue.' This is why we
are giving a hard look at institutions, such as the U.N., that must
reform to meet new challenges.
Cutting funding for the U.N. means limiting our ability to
address vital development needs and to negotiate important en-
vironmental agreements and share needed information on cli-
mate change, on ozone depletion, on oceans and fisheries. In
an integrated global economy, environmental damage in one
part of the world can affect economies everywhere. Pollution's
impact on our nation's health takes an enormous toll on our
manufacturing, service, and agricultural productivity. Disap-
pearing cropland worldwide, coupled with a projected doubling
in world population, may lead to dramatic rises in world food
prices. Whether we like it or not, these threats to our well-being
are best addressed through negotiations at international organi-
zations like the U.N.
Our third principle is that we must support democracy and
human rights if we want a policy that not only reflects our ideals,
but also reinforces our interests. Promoting democratic values
amplifies our authority and credibility in the world. Our inter-
ests are most secure in a world where the rule of law protects
both political rights and free market economies. From working
with courageous reformers in South Africa, Mexico, or the new
democracies of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, to
supporting the War Crimes Tribunal and elections process in
the former Yugoslavia, this principle both closely reflects our im-
3. See Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Ensuing Peace and Stability on the Ko-
rean Peninsula (November 9, 1994), Remarks to the Korea-America Friendship Society,
Seoul, Korea, in DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, November 1994. The Northeast Asian Security
Dialogue also provides a valuable forum for advancing the United States' common in-
terest in regional stability. Id.
POLICY AND PRINCIPLES
age of ourself and accepts that there are limits to our ability to
help others set themselves free.
Our fourth principle is constructive relations with the great
powers - our long-standing allies in Western Europe andJapan,
as well as our former adversaries in Russia and China. We live in
a world where these four powers, each in its own way, have the
ability to significantly affect our security and prosperity.
Some have said that in the absence of an overwhelming
common threat, America's relationship with its core allies would
inevitably drift apart. After three years of close cooperation with
our friends in Europe and Japan, we can fairly claim that the
opposite is true. Our common action in Bosnia has done more
for European cooperation and stability than years of sterile theo-
retical debates over competing "security architectures." And the
New Transatlantic Agenda that we launched last month in Ma-
drid will expand our economic ties, and strengthen our coopera-
tion with the European Union in confronting global political
and security challenges.
Our cooperation with Japan has also deepened in response
to new opportunities and challenges. A year-long review of our
alliance has revitalized our security ties. Japan has worked with
us to end the North Korean nuclear program, and we have main-
tained our security relationship in the face of domestic chal-
lenges in both countries. While there continue to be important
trade issues between us, the 20 market access agreements we
have reached contribute to the recent sharp decline in our bilat-
eral trade deficit - as you saw in today's New York Times.4
Nowhere is the task of the policy-planner, or of the policy-
maker, more challenging than in dealing with Russia and China.
The unprecedented and painful transitions that Russia and
China are currently undertaking embody the range of chal-
lenges and opportunities we confront in the world today.
We have recognized that Russia's transition to a more dem-
ocratic, market-oriented society would be long and difficult, and
the outcome not foreordained. But there are vital U.S. interests
at stake in our relations with Russia, and practical cooperation
where possible increases both our countries' security and pros-
perity. In light of a half-century of confrontation, it is important
4. Andrew Pollack, Japan Trade Surplus Shrinks for the First Time in 5 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al.
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to reflect how far we - and the Russian people themselves -
have come.
Of course it would be easy to enumerate our differences
with Russia. Its ongoing struggle with the conflict in Chechnya,
crime and corruption, and Moscow's nuclear cooperation with
Iran indicate that this transition will not be easy, and may impact
on American interests and Russia's own development. Russia is
still struggling to define its future at home and abroad. Ulti-
mately, the Russian people alone will decide whether they, too,
can define a new path for Russia, or whether they will turn to the
forces who prey on their fears. Russians face an important
choice in the June Presidential elections. Our key obligation is
to engage Russia by promoting democratic values and institu-
tions, while keeping watch over our own national interest at all
times.
For those who follow our relations with China, it will proba-
bly sound like an understatement to say that the last year has
been difficult, and in important respects, disappointing. China
remains an authoritarian state, though far from the totalitarian
monolith it once was. Important differences remain between
our two countries on issues such as human rights, proliferation,
and trade. Having abandoned the substance of communism,
and lacking a credible ideological replacement, China's leaders
have sought to mobilize support by emphasizing nationalistic
themes of order in confronting a deep-seated fear of chaos, and
unfurling the banner of sovereignty in response to perceived for-
eign pressure and influence. Its continued insistence on the
right to use force to protect its claims to sovereignty in Taiwan
and the South China Sea will not ease regional tensions.
Our Administration does not seek to isolate or contain
China. This is not because we want to do China a favor, but
because engagement serves our interests and the interests of our
friends and allies in the region. We seek to restore positive mo-
mentum to the relationship. We remain committed to the "one
China" policy forged through successive Democratic and Repub-
lican administrations. We are also committed to finding con-
structive ways to address our differences, and to cooperate on
common concerns.
Secretary Christopher has stated very clearly that the United
States will do its part. But if we are to build a lasting, productive
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relationship, China has a responsibility to take meaningful steps
to address areas of our concern and to respect internationally
accepted principles. Whatever our problems or disagreements,
we need to understand that China will be a major - and grow-
ing - factor on the Asian regional scene, and in the world.
Whether in terms of maintaining stability in the Taiwan strait, on
the Korean peninsula or in the South China Sea, whether in
terms of fostering an economic regime in the Asia Pacific that
promotes our own prosperity as well as that of our trading part-
ners, or whether in terms of the effective functioning of the
United Nations and other institutions of the international sys-
tem, China will be a key player.
As we have successfully confronted this world of opportunity
and danger, it is ironic that the biggest challenge to securing our
interests abroad may be a fraying consensus at home. Of course,
we must address challenges in the United States. There is no
disputing that. Those whom I call the "new isolationists" do not
deny that we have a stake in the world. But absent the kind of
immediate and overriding threat posed by communism, they fail
to appreciate how early and effective actions by the U.S. to pre-
vent crises, to build and maintain international institutions, to
support democracy and human rights, and to maintain construc-
tive relations with our key allies and other important global ac-
tors, can help us avoid much more costly and dangerous inter-
ventions in the future.
As the President argued last night, American leadership is
crucial to advancing our economic interests abroad, and to cre-
ating a world safe from destabilizing conflicts, and threats from
crime, terrorism, and environmental decay. Never has our en-
gagement been more vital. Isolationism will always strike a re-
sponsive chord with Americans, in part because we have long
been at peace with the countries on our borders, and in part
because vast oceans separate us from Europe, Asia and Africa.
But the countries on our borders share with us a free trade area
that continues to create American jobs. And Europe, Asia, and
Africa are no longer that far away, thanks to rapid communica-
tions and transportation, and thanks to our increasingly interde-
pendent economies.
We cannot afford to look back nostalgically at the days of
containment, nor wait for a new overwhelming security threat to
emerge. As the President said last evening, today's dangers
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know no borders. The loss of nuclear materials from one coun-
try is a challenge to the security of all countries. We must work
with others to confront these transnational problems. Though
we no longer have a single enemy around which we can rally
public support, the stakes are too high to withdraw from a world
that we have helped to create and which reflects American inter-
ests and values more than at any time in our history.
